Manipulability of Voting Systems
Read the book chapters first, then make sure you can answer the questions in the notes. Following that, work on some skills-check problems and exercises. Then take the online quizzes.
- Reading
- 10.1-10.4
- Skills Check
- 7, 11, 13, 15, 27
- Exercises
- 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24
- Quiz
- No quiz this week
10.1
- When precisely do we say that a voting system is manipulable?
10.2
- Explain why Condorcet’s Method is non-manipulable.
10.3
- Show that the Borda Count on 3 candidates is non-manipulable, but on 4 or more candidates it is manipulable.
- Show that the Hare system is manipulable.
- Show that the Sequential Pairwise Voting system is manipulable.
10.4
- What does the Gibbard-Satterwaite Theorem say?